When an engineering team in India works on systems that contain personal data, the DACH client has two data protection tasks. First, the vendor typically acts as a processor, which requires a data processing agreement (Auftragsverarbeitungsvertrag, AVV) under Art. 28 DSGVO. Second, India has no adequacy decision from the European Commission, so access from India is a transfer to a third country that needs a transfer tool under Art. 44 ff. DSGVO, in practice the Standardvertragsklauseln (standard contractual clauses, SCCs). Both are routine if prepared properly. The most effective measure, however, is to reduce the personal data the team actually touches.

The enforcement context

Data protection enforcement in Europe remains steady. The DLA Piper GDPR Fines and Data Breach Survey published in January 2026 puts the GDPR fines imposed across Europe in 2025 at about EUR 1.2 billion, bringing the total since 2018 to about EUR 7.1 billion. Breach notifications rose 22 percent to an average of 443 per day, the first time the daily average has exceeded 400. Each of those notifications is a reminder that access paths, including those of external engineering teams, are part of the risk surface.

India's own framework is moving as well. The Digital Personal Data Protection Rules were notified in November 2025, with key obligations phased in over 12 to 18 months and penalties under the DPDP Act of up to INR 250 crore per breach. This does not replace the DSGVO analysis below, which remains decisive for a DACH controller, but it changes the legal environment your vendor operates in and belongs in any transfer impact assessment.

Step one: map whether personal data is involved

Many engineering engagements involve personal data indirectly: production database access for debugging, application logs with user identifiers, support tickets with customer details, analytics exports, or copies of production data in test environments. European supervisory authorities treat remote access from a third country to data stored in the EU as a transfer. Hosting in Frankfurt alone does not take the engagement out of Chapter V of the DSGVO if engineers in Bangalore can read the data.

A short inventory per system helps: which environments the team accesses, which data categories exist there, and whether access is technically necessary for the agreed work.

Step two: the AVV under Art. 28 DSGVO

Art. 28 Abs. 3 DSGVO requires a contract that sets out the subject matter and duration, the nature and purpose of processing, the type of personal data and categories of data subjects, and the rights and obligations of the controller. It must in particular oblige the processor to:

  • process only on documented instructions, including with regard to transfers to third countries (lit. a);
  • ensure confidentiality commitments of authorised persons (lit. b);
  • take the security measures required by Art. 32 (lit. c);
  • respect the conditions for engaging sub-processors (lit. d, with Abs. 2 and 4);
  • assist with data subject rights and with obligations under Art. 32 to 36 (lit. e and f);
  • delete or return data at the end of the service (lit. g);
  • make information available and allow audits (lit. h).

The SCCs in modules 2 and 3 are designed to also address the requirements of Art. 28 Abs. 3 and 4 DSGVO. Many companies nevertheless keep a separate AVV for clarity, with the SCCs attached, and make sure the two documents do not contradict each other.

Step three: the SCCs

The current SCCs were adopted by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914. They are modular:

ConstellationModule
German controller engages Indian vendor as processorModule 2 (controller to processor)
German or EU vendor (processor) engages Indian sub-processorModule 3 (processor to processor)
Indian company acts as independent controllerModule 1 (controller to controller), rare in engineering engagements

The clauses themselves must not be modified. The work lies in the annexes: Annex I (parties, description of the transfer, competent supervisory authority), Annex II (technical and organisational measures, which must be specific rather than generic) and Annex III (list of sub-processors where applicable).

Step four: the transfer impact assessment

Clause 14 of the SCCs requires the parties to warrant that they have no reason to believe that the laws and practices of the destination country prevent the importer from fulfilling its obligations. This assessment, usually called transfer impact assessment (TIA), should be documented. For India, it typically considers:

  • the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 and the DPDP Rules notified in November 2025, which apply in phases;
  • powers of public authorities to access or intercept data, for example under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act 2000;
  • the specific circumstances of the transfer: data categories, volume, access paths, and whether data is stored in India or only accessed remotely;
  • the supplementary measures that reduce the practical risk.

The TIA is not a one-time document. It should be reviewed when the legal situation in India changes or when the scope of access changes.

Step five: supplementary and minimising measures

  1. Synthetic or pseudonymised test data. Most development work does not require real personal data. Generating test data removes the transfer for those environments entirely.
  2. Access through EU-hosted environments. Virtual desktops or bastion hosts in the EU, with no local download, limit what leaves the EU environment.
  3. Role-based and time-limited production access. Production access only for named incidents, with approval and logging.
  4. Encryption with keys held in the EU. Where data must be stored outside the EU, keys under the client's control reduce exposure.
  5. Device and identity controls. Managed devices, multi-factor authentication, disk encryption and central offboarding.

Common gaps in practice

  • Annex II copied from a generic template, describing measures the vendor does not actually operate.
  • Tools used by engineers with client data, such as cloud development environments, AI coding assistants or ticketing systems, not assessed as further sub-processors or transfers.
  • No defined process for incident reporting fast enough for the controller to meet the 72-hour deadline of Art. 33 DSGVO.
  • Access rights that remain active after individual engineers leave the engagement.

Austria and Switzerland

Austrian companies apply the DSGVO directly, with the same document set. Swiss companies fall under the revised Federal Act on Data Protection (revDSG/FADP). The Swiss supervisory authority has recognised the EU SCCs for transfers from Switzerland, subject to Swiss-specific adaptations, so a single document set can usually serve DACH groups with a Swiss addendum.

Document checklist

  • Processing inventory for the engagement (systems, data categories, access paths)
  • AVV under Art. 28 DSGVO
  • SCCs, correct module, completed annexes I to III
  • Documented TIA
  • Description of TOMs matching reality, reviewed annually
  • Sub-processor list with notification procedure
  • Offboarding and deletion confirmation procedure

This article is general information and does not constitute legal advice for your specific situation.

Data protection for an India-based team is easiest to get right when it is designed into the engagement rather than added after the first audit question. In a niogod™ pod, the vendor employs and directs its own engineers under a Werkvertrag or Dienstvertrag, which gives the AVV a clearly defined processor and a single Projektleiter accountable for how instructions and access are handled. The security page outlines the approach, and if an offshore setup is on your roadmap, settling these documents early saves a harder conversation with your data protection officer later.

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